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A Colossal Bird’s Nest: The Backlash Surrounding the
Management of the Gulf of Mexico Red Snapper
Fishery
INTRODUCTION
“Think about it like this,” posited one member of the Theodore
Roosevelt Conservation Partnership, “[i]f the federal government told the
states of Montana, Wyoming, Colorado, New Mexico, and Nevada that
their hunters were going to get one day to kill a mule deer on their own,
but if they were willing to pay a guide, they’d get 40 days,” what option
would the hunters choose?1 The question, propounded in response to new
federal regulations bearing on red snapper populations in the Gulf of
Mexico, juxtaposes the interests of sportsmen in two drastically different
environments. By recently passing regulations regarding Gulf of Mexico
red snapper, the federal government has reeled important and controversial
issues to the surface of the whirling sea of discontent between Gulf
fishermen and government agencies. Is there merit to the conservationist’s
analogy? And, if so, how and why would behavioral patterns of Midwest
hunters be applicable to red snapper fishermen in the Gulf Region?
The Gulf red snapper persists as a hot commodity for the tourism and
fishing industries in the Gulf region as well as in restaurants across the
United States. The bright rosy-red hue of the red snapper’s scales conceals
the soft, white, mild-flavored meat that leaves seafood lovers craving
more. These beautiful creatures glide effortlessly through the Gulf of
Mexico’s reefs and oil rigs everyday, yet they are completely unaware of
the storm brewing above the surface.
Federal management of red snapper in the Gulf of Mexico has been
described as “a mess,”2 “pure chaos,”3 and “a painfully obvious attempt to
disenfranchise the recreational sector in favor of the desires of a New York
based environmental activist group to end public access to the red snapper
Copyright 2016, by ETIENNE RENÉ.
1. Todd Masson, Feds to give Significant Portion of Recreational Red-snapper
Quota to Charter-boat Industry, NOLA, (Nov. 1, 2014, 12:53 PM), http://www.nola
.com/outdoors/index.ssf/2014/10/feds_to_give_significant_porti.html [https://perma
.cc/EJ79-2DGU].
2. David Cresson, Guest Commentary: Gulf Fishery Management a Huge
Mess, THE ADVOCATE, (Aug. 28, 2014), http://theadvocate.com/news/opinion
/10116820-123/guest-commentary-gulf-fishery-manangement [https://perma.cc
/Y76Y-4J5F].
3. Chaos Reigns at Gulf Council, COASTAL CONSERVATION ASS’N (July 31,
2014), http://www.joincca.org/articles/680 [https://perma.cc/HA3A-YWFD].
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fishery.”4 Indeed, both fishermen and federal agencies alike have fallen
under fire for the disorderly management of the fishery.
Demand for the high quality of red snapper has prompted both
commercial5 and recreational6 fishermen to harvest the species as quickly
and efficiently as possible.7 This “derby-style” competition has led to
immense problems in the management of the species. Proliferating
litigation, incredibly short fishing seasons, and federal emergency rulings
have converged, casting the Gulf red snapper fishery into a frenzied and
confusing state.8
Disagreements and competition among commercial and recreational
fishermen, coupled with regulations that fail to address those conflicts
fairly and successfully, continue to swirl around this economically and
socially important fish. One factor vital to the disputes over red snapper
management in the Gulf concerns the actual health of the Gulf red snapper
population. Some red snapper fishermen, furious with the exceedingly
truncated length of recent federal red snapper seasons in the Gulf, allege
that the red snapper population is healthier than it has ever been; they view
the short seasons as a denial of access to an abundant natural resource.9
Federal agencies and other interested parties, however, assert that, because
the species is overfished, these measures are a necessary component of a
rebuilding plan.10 Regardless of the validity of either side’s contention, the
recent federal management standards utilized in regulating Gulf red
4. Vitter Urges Gulf Council to Table Divisive Red Snapper Proposal,
COASTAL CONSERVATION ASS’N, http://www.ccalouisiana.com/cca11/index.php
/press-room-60/press-releases/582-vitter-urges-gulf-council-to-table-divisive-redsnapper-proposal [https://perma.cc/88EL-ZLDC] (last visited Jan. 28, 2016).
5. Commercial fishing is specified as “fishing in which the fish harvested, either
in whole or in part, are intended to enter commerce or enter commerce through sale,
barter, or trade.” 16 U.S.C. § 1802(4) (2013).
6. Recreational fishing is designated as “fishing for sport or pleasure.” 16 U.S.C.
§ 1802(37) (2013).
7. See Gulf Anglers Unite for Red Snapper, THE RECREATIONAL FISHING
ALLIANCE (Apr. 2, 2014), http://joinrfa.org/2014/04/31314-gulf-anglers-unite-forred-snapper/ [https://perma.cc/MDJ2-HW8A].
8. This comment will analyze each of these issues and how they relate to current
problems with federal Gulf red snapper management.
9. Help Fix the Gulf Red Snapper Problem, AMERICAN FISHING TACKLE
COMPANY (Sept. 10, 2014), http://www.aftco.com/wheelhouse/gulf-red-snapper-doyour-part/ [https://perma.cc/9X4E-DF6Z].
10. GULF OF MEXICO FISHERY MGMT. COUNCIL, RECREATIONAL RED SNAPPER
SECTOR SEPARATION: FINAL AMENDMENT 40 TO THE FISHERY MGMT. PLAN FOR THE
R EEF F ISH R ESOURCES OF THE G ULF OF M EXICO , 1 (2014), available at
http://sero.nmfs.noaa.gov/sustainable_fisheries/gulf_fisheries/reef_fish/2013/am40/d
ocuments/pdfs/gulf_rf_am40_feis.pdf [hereinafter FINAL AMENDMENT 40]; see also
Red Snapper, HARTE RESEARCH INST. GULF OF MEXICO STUDIES, http://www
.harteresearchinstitute.org/ochealth-research/red-snapper [https://perma.cc/B9S7ECX8] (last visited Jan. 16, 2015) [hereinafter H ARTE R ESEARCH I NST.].
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snapper have sparked tremendous controversy, litigation, quota overages,
violations of federal law, and inequitable access to red snapper for certain
fishermen.
Many red snapper fishermen are worried that the recent enactment of
Amendment 40 to the Fishery Management Plan for the Reef Fish
Resources of the Gulf of Mexico (Amendment 40) marked the beginning
of the privatization of the Gulf of Mexico red snapper industry.11 These
fishermen allege that the approval of the amendment will ultimately place
access to Gulf red snapper in the hands of a few individuals for private
profit.12 Determining the credibility of this assertion necessitates an
examination of the current status of the Gulf of Mexico red snapper fishery
and the adequacy of the management measures used to regulate the
species.
In order to compete with state regulations and fishermen’s rapid
harvesting of red snapper, federal regulations have continuously been
enacted that attempt to cure short-term concerns, but those regulations fail
to address the underlying issue creating the predicament with red snapper
management. An analysis of recent federal regulations, litigation, and
statistics regarding the harvesting of red snapper illuminates the main
problem: The inadequate regulation of the recreational red snapper fishing
sector lies at the root of the problems in overall Gulf red snapper
management.
This comment addresses the issues with contemporary federal
regulations governing the Gulf of Mexico recreational red snapper fishery
and suggests the appropriate approach to take in managing the species.
Part I will provide a brief history of the Gulf red snapper fishery and the
administrative and legal authority under which the fishery is governed.
Next, Part II will explore the promulgation of the first federal rules
concerning Gulf red snapper, along with the federal management strategy
of the recreational sector of the fishery utilized until the enactment of
Amendment 40. Part III will examine initial litigation, the 2014
recreational red snapper season, and the reasons for the chaos surrounding
the regulation of the fishery in recent years. Part IV will discuss
Amendment 40 and its objectives, the 2015 recreational red snapper
11. See GULF OF MEXICO FISHERY MGMT. COUNCIL, RECREATIONAL RED
SNAPPER SECTOR SEPARATION: DRAFT OPTIONS FOR AMENDMENT 40 TO THE
FISHERY MGMT. PLAN FOR THE REEF FISH RESOURCES OF THE GULF OF MEXICO, 1
(2014), available at http://gulfcouncil.org/docs/amendments/Amendment
%2040%20Sector%20Separation.pdf [hereinafter DRAFT OPTIONS FOR AMENDMENT
40]; see also Amendment 40 Privatization Scheme, COASTAL CONSERVATION
ASSOCIATION, http://www.joincca.org/Amendment40_Highlights [https://perma.cc
/LH27-NALV] (last visited Jan. 16, 2015) [hereinafter Amendment 40 Privatization
Scheme].
12. See Amendment 40 Privatization Scheme, supra note 11.
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season, recent litigation, and why Amendment 40 is not the solution for
the long-term management of the fishery. Finally, Part V proposes the
optimal solution to resolve the issues facing federal Gulf red snapper
management.
I. OPENING THE TACKLEBOX: THE BACKGROUND ON THE GULF RED
SNAPPER FISHERY
Throughout the first half of the twentieth century, the Gulf red
snapper, scientific name Lutjanus campechanus, was commonly confused
with other snapper species, such as the Caribbean red snapper, Lutjanus
purpureus.13 Despite the difference in species, the term “red snapper” was
usually used in reference to the former, because Gulf red snapper were
known as the superb caliber of fish.14 In the 1960s, the distinction between
the different species—and the inherent eminence of the Gulf red
snapper—became apparent. Nevertheless, fishermen began to use the
generic term “red snapper” to refer to all types of red snapper.15 Regardless
of potential misnomers, the Gulf red snapper maintains prominence as
arguably the most sought after fish, yielding the greatest economic impact
on both the recreational and commercial fishing industries,16 which in turn
provide billions of dollars to the economies of Gulf Coast communities
each year.17

13. JOSEPH E. TASHIRO, ANNOTATED BIBLIOGRAPHY AND SUBJECT INDICES
WESTERN ATLANTIC SNAPPERS (LUTJANIDAE), 3 (1979), available at http:
//www.st.nmfs.noaa.gov/tm/sefc/sefc008.pdf.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Red Snapper (Lutjanus Campechanus), GULF COAST MARINE LIFE CENTER,
http://www.gcmlc.com/species-finfish-red_snapper.php [https://perma.cc/E5DVERME] (last visited Jan. 29, 2016) (“Red snapper is the most economically important
fish in the Gulf of Mexico for both the commercial and recreational fishing
industries.”); see also HARTE RESEARCH INSTITUTE, supra note 10 (“Red snapper
represents a vital economic commodity . . . and supports highly lucrative commercial
and recreational fisheries.”).
17. Landrieu: Nine-Day Red Snapper Season Hurts Fishermen and Gulf
Economy, COASTAL CONSERVATION ASS’N, http://www.ccalouisiana.com/cca11
/index.php/press-room-60/press-releases/555-landrieu-nine-day-red-snapper-seasonhurts-fishermen-and-gulf-economy [https://perma.cc/FP4U-92JC] (last visited Jan.
29, 2016).
FOR
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A. The Spawning: A Brief History of Gulf Red Snapper Fishing
Fishing efforts for red snapper in the Gulf of Mexico began in the
1840s in the northwestern portion of the Gulf;18 by 1872, the red snapper
fishery constituted its own self-sustaining industry.19 With the increased
prevalence of ice and trains for transport in the late nineteenth and early
twentieth century, the harvesting of red snapper greatly increased—in the
early 1900s, it was not uncommon for total annual Gulf red snapper
landings to exceed ten million pounds.20 Because increased fishing
depleted red snapper in local waters, fishermen began expanding their
fishing voyages to other areas of the Gulf.21 Soon thereafter, tourism in the
Gulf states, the production of fiberglass boats, and the improvement in
boat motor technology in the mid-twentieth century greatly increased
recreational fishing activity in the Gulf.22 This proliferation of sport
fishermen led to an astronomical spike in the annual recreational
harvesting of red snapper, from an estimated 50,000 pounds to over five
million pounds between World War II and the 1990s.23
Unfortunately, consistent, reliable data pertaining to pre-1981
recreational red snapper harvests is difficult to determine on a year-byyear basis.24 Nevertheless, it is without question that red snapper
harvesting reached its climax in the 1960s.25 Subsequent harvests would
not reflect continued growth at the same rate as in years prior due to a new
fishing prohibition in foreign waters and a trending decrease in the size of
Gulf snapper.26

18. PETER B. HOOD ET AL., A History of Red Snapper Management in the
Gulf of Mexico, in RED SNAPPER: ECOLOGY AND FISHERIES IN THE U.S. GULF OF
MEXICO, 1 (2007), available at http://web.fisheries.org/proofs/red/hood.pdf.
19. B.J. GALLAWAY ET AL., Estimates of Shrimp Trawl Bycatch of Red Snapper
(Lutjanus campechanus) in the Gulf of Mexico, in FISHERY STOCK ASSESSMENT
MODELS, ALASKA SEA GRANT COLLEGE PROGRAM, 817, 818 (1998), available at
http://nsgl.gso.uri.edu/aku/akuw97002/akuw97002_part9.pdf.
20. Hood et al., supra note 18.
21. Id.
22. JOHN F. WALTER, BACKCALCULATION OF RECREATIONAL CATCH OF RED
GROUPER FROM 1945 TO 1985, Nat’l Marine Fisheries Services, Southeast Fisheries
Science Center, SEDAR12-DW15 Contribution (July 2006), 3, available at http:
//sedarweb.org/docs/wpapers/S12%20DW15%20BackCalc%20rec%20catch.pdf.
23. SEDAR 7, Stock assessment of SEDAR 7: Gulf of Mexico red snapper,
Southeast Data, Assessment, and Review, Charleston, S.C., 480 (2005). See also
Hood et al., supra note 18, at 1–2.
24. Hood et al., supra note 18, at 1–2.
25. Id.
26. Id.
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B. Casting the Sinking Net: The Administrative and Legal Authority
Under which the Gulf Red Snapper Fishery Floats
Operating under the United States Department of Commerce and the
Secretary of Commerce (Secretary), the National Oceanic and
Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) is the federal agency responsible
for the management and conservation of the nation’s oceanic species.27
The National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS) is the national office of
the NOAA controlling fishery management.28 In conjunction with regional
councils, the NMFS is charged with overseeing federal fishery
management plans and ensuring proper regulation of United States
territorial waters.29
In 1976, Congress enacted the Magnuson-Stevens Fishery
Conservation and Management Act (MSA) to govern fishery management
in United States federal waters.30 Commonly referred to as the Exclusive
Economic Zone (EEZ), United States federal waters in the Gulf of Mexico
extend from the end of state waters outward two hundred nautical miles.31
Legislators passed the MSA for several purposes: (1) to conserve and
manage fisheries in the waters surrounding the United States, (2) to foster
commercial and recreational fishing industries with appropriate
management standards, and (3) to implement fishery management plans
that maintain the optimum yield of fisheries while complying with national
standards.32 The MSA operates in accordance with ten “national
standards” to keep the goals of fishery management in view while
implementing legislation.33 Attempting to properly conserve and preserve
oceanic species, while also allowing fishermen to utilize the oceans’
natural resources by harvesting these species, proves a daunting and
difficult task. The United States District Court for the District of Columbia
has opined that the “legal framework Congress established to direct the
management of fish stocks is of necessity multifaceted, specific, and
complex.”34

27. 5 U.S.C. app. § 1 (2010).
28. Niki Pace, Ecosystem-Based Management under the Magnuson-Stevens
Act: Managing the Competing Interests of the Gulf of Mexico Red Snapper and
Shrimp Fisheries, 2 SEA GRANT L. & POL’Y J. 1, 3 (2009).
29. Fishery Conservation and Management Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-265,
90 Stat. 348 at Sec. 302(b)(1)(B); see also 16 U.S.C. § 1852(b)(1)(B).
30. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1801–84 (2013).
31. 16 U.S.C. §§ 5102(6), 1802(11), 1811(a).
32. Guindon v. Pritzker, 31 F. Supp.3d 169, 175 (D.D.C. Mar. 26, 2014); see
also 16 U.S.C. § 1801(b).
33. See 16 U.S.C. § 1851(a).
34. Guindon, 31 F. Supp.3d at 175 (describing the provisions of the MSA).
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In order to assist the NMFS in the implementation of fishery
management and regulation, the MSA established eight federal regional
councils to aid in the administration of each respective region’s fisheries.35
These regional councils of the NOAA are charged with developing fishery
management plans (FMPs) for each fishery over which they bear authority,
respectively.36 Once each regional council submits FMPs, FMP
amendments, or proposed regulations to the Secretary of Commerce, the
Secretary evaluates the plans and ensures that they align with the
provisions of the MSA and other pertinent laws.37 The Secretary, operating
through the NMFS, then has thirty days to approve, partially approve, or
deny the proposed plans or regulations.38
The Gulf of Mexico Fisheries Management Council (Gulf Council) is
the regional chapter of the NOAA that regulates the fisheries of the Gulf
of Mexico.39 The Gulf Council has federal jurisdiction over the Gulf
coastal regions of Louisiana, Mississippi, Alabama, Florida, and Texas.40
Pursuant to section 303(a)(15) of the MSA, FMPs must establish
mechanisms for identifying annual catch limits41 while also implementing
regulations to prevent overfishing––including accountability measures.42
Section 407(d) of the MSA, applying exclusively to the Gulf of Mexico
red snapper fishery,43 dictates that FMPs—or any amendments thereto—
must create separate recreational and commercial fishing quotas that, once
reached, place a prohibition on any future harvesting of red snapper for the
rest of the fishing year.44
When contemplating whether to enact certain regulations or FMPs, the
Gulf Council analyzes the Southeast Data, Assessment, and Review
(SEDAR) stock evaluation to review the status of the red snapper
population.45 SEDAR stock assessments gauge information on the red
snapper’s average weight, spawning habits, mortality rates, overall
35. 16 U.S.C. § 1852(a)(1).
36. 16 U.S.C. § 1852(h)(1).
37. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1854(a), 1851(a), 1854(b)(1).
38. 16 U.S.C. §1854(a)(3).
39. 16 U.S.C. § 1852(E).
40. Id.
41. Annual Catch Limits (ACL) represent the amount of fishing that the
NMFS permits each year. Guindon, 31 F. Supp. 3d at 177.
42. Accountability Measures (AM) are “management controls to prevent
ACLs, including sector–ACLs, from being exceeded, and to correct or mitigate
overages of the ACL if they occur. AMs should address and minimize both the
frequency and magnitude of overages and correct the problem that caused the
overage in as short a time as possible.” 50 C.F.R. § 600.310(g)(1)(2013); see also
16 U.S.C. § 1853(a)(15).
43. Guindon, 31 F. Supp. 3d at 176; see also 16 U.S.C. § 1853.
44. Guindon, 31 F. Supp. 3d at 176; see also 16 U.S.C. § 1883(d)(1).
45. Guindon, 31 F. Supp. 3d at 178.
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population, and other factors indicating the size and health of the fishery.46
The Council utilizes these assessments to determine whether to develop
new FMPs or to amend existing regulations.47
II. CHUMMING THE WATER: FEDERAL REGULATION OF GULF RED
SNAPPER
Federal management of Gulf red snapper is a relatively modern
regulatory scheme, beginning in the late twentieth century. In the past
decade or so, SEDAR assessments, along with other studies and reports,
have prompted a dynamic trend of federal red snapper regulations
attempting to efficiently manage the species.
A. The First Bite: Background on Gulf Red Snapper Regulations
Initial regulations were imposed on the red snapper fishery in the
1980s due to reports regarding the unhealthy status of the red snapper
fishery.48 By-catch—the incidental and inadvertent catching of red
snapper in shrimping nets—was the impetus for imposing the initial
regulations on Gulf snapper.49 With the expansion of the Gulf shrimping
industry in the 1960s, large amounts of juvenile red snapper were killed in
shrimp trawl nets, resulting in the decline of the overall red snapper
population.50 This decline prompted the creation of the original
management structure of the red snapper fishery.51
From the early 1980s until 2009, SEDAR conducted red snapper
population assessments. In 2009, a SEDAR study reported that the
management standards were effectively rebuilding the population.52
According to the report, overfishing—the phenomenon occurring when the
rate at which fish are removed from the water due to fishing is too high—had

46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Gloria Godsell and Mary Penny Thompson, Issues Surrounding the Gulf
of Mexico Red Snapper Fishery and the Impact of the Magnuson Act
Reauthorization, 9 TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 267, 268–70 (1996).
49. Id. Restrictions have since been implemented to prevent by-catch, so that
this phenomenon no longer predominates as a primary concern pertinent to red
snapper management and rebuilding.
50. GULF OF MEXICO FISHERY MGMT. COUNCIL, FISHERY MANAGEMENT PLAN
FOR THE SHRIMP FISHERY OF THE GULF OF MEXICO, UNITED STATES WATERS, 3-110
(1981), available at http://gulfcouncil.org/docs/amendments/SHRIMP%20FMP
%20Final%201981-11.pdf.
51. Godsell, supra note 48.
52. See SEDAR, Stock Assessment of Red Snapper in the Gulf of Mexico:
SEDAR Update Assessment (2009).
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ceased.53 That assertion found further support in a 2013 assessment by the
NMFS, which revealed that overfishing was not occurring and catch limits
could therefore increase; however, that same report stated that although the
stock was rebuilding, the fishery remained overfished—meaning, that, despite
no active overfishing taking place, the population numbers of the stock had
not rebounded and were still too low.54
Because of the success of the rebuilding process, the catch limits of
Gulf red snapper have steadily increased in recent years. The catch limit
for both the commercial and recreational sectors in 2008 and 2009 was
five million pounds; by 2013, the limit increased to eleven million pounds,
thanks largely to the attainment of rebuilding objectives.55 As large as that
increase may seem, the NMFS further stated that the limit could have
potentially soared to 13.5 million pounds in 2013, but regulators refrained
from setting such a liberal limit because doing so would necessitate a
deduction for the 2014 and 2015 seasons.56
B. The Receding Tide: Gulf Red Snapper Regulations Through the 2014
Season
Red snapper fishery management has generally been split into two
divisions: the commercial sector and the recreational sector. Prior to the
commencement of the red snapper season, the Council would use the
upcoming year’s projected Acceptable Biological Catch57 (ABC) to propose
a per annum quota.58 The recreational and commercial sectors would each be
awarded an allocation of the total Gulf red snapper quota.59 The commercial
sector has received, and continues to receive, fifty-one percent of the overall
quota, with the remaining forty-nine percent allocated to the recreational
sector.60 However, if enacted, Amendment 28 to the Fishery Management
Plan for the Reef Fish Resources of the Gulf of Mexico may reallocate this
proportion of the quota to reflect a recreational to commercial ratio of 51.5 to
53. See id.
54. See SEDAR, SEDAR 31: Gulf of Mexico Red Snapper Stock Assessment
Report (2013).
55. See FINAL AMENDMENT 40, supra note 10, at 35.
56. Guindon, 31 F. Supp. 3d at 182.
57. Acceptable Biological Catch (ABC) is “an annual catch figure, set at or
below the OFL [Overfishing Limit], with the difference between the OFL and the
ABC designed to account for scientific uncertainty in the SSC’s [Scientific and
Statistical Committee] calculation of the OFL . . . . ABC is an expression of the
amount of fish that fishermen could harvest during a particular year without
overfishing the stock, with accommodation for scientific uncertainty.” Guindon,
31 F. Supp. 3d at 177; see 50 C.F.R. §§ 600.310(f)(2) (ii)(2013).
58. Guindon, 31 F. Supp. 3d at 178.
59. 16 U.S.C. § 1883(d).
60. Guindon, 31 F. Supp. 3d at 178; see 50 C.F.R. § 622.21.
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48.5 percent, respectively.61 The Gulf Council based this decision on the
results of a 2014 red snapper assessment update and alleged that this
reallocation of the quota will better serve each sector’s needs.62 Amendment
28 is currently under a public comment period.
1. Commercial Fishing Regulations
Since 2007, the commercial sector has been regulated according to an
“individual fishing quota” (IFQ).63 Under this program, commercial
fisherman must apply for an IFQ allocation, which is the amount of Gulf
red snapper that a commercial fisherman is authorized to possess, land, or
sell per year.64 This allocation is determined by “multiplying a
shareholder’s IFQ share times the annual commercial quota for Gulf red
snapper.”65 The IFQ management measure has appropriately regulated the
commercial red snapper fishing industry and prevented a quota overrun
because “each IFQ allocation holder is strictly monitored to ensure they
do not land more fish than pounds allocated to them through the
program.”66 In fact, the IFQ program has been so effective in regulating
the commercial red snapper fishing sector that the 2010 Amendment to the
Reef Fish FMP states “there is no possibility of a quota overrun for the
commercial sector.”67 Since the commercial sector is effectively regulated
without the potential for quota overruns, the current issues in red snapper
management must by necessity stem from the inadequacies of recreational
red snapper regulations that fail to impede quota overruns, thereby
obstructing equitable access to the federal red snapper fishery for certain
fishermen.
61. GULF OF MEXICO FISHERY MGMT. COUNCIL, RED SNAPPER ALLOCATION:
F INAL AMENDMENT 28 TO THE F ISHERY M GMT. P LAN FOR THE R EEF F ISH
R ESOURCES OF THE G ULF OF M EXICO , 18 (2015), available at http://gulf
council.org/docs/amendments/Final%20Red%20Snapper%20Allocation%20-RF
%20Amendment%2028.pdf.
62. Id. at 4.
63. Individual Fishing Quota (IFQ) is defined as “a Federal permit under a
limited access system to harvest a quantity of fish, expressed by a unit or units
representing a percentage of the total allowable catch of a fishery that may be
received or held for exclusive use by a person.” 16 U.S.C. § 1802(23). The
Regional Administrator (RA) issues shares equivalent to a percentage of the
annual commercial red snapper quota based on pertinent historical landings.
These shares comprise the Gulf Red Snapper IFQ allocation that is permitted for
each commercial fisherman. See 50 C.F.R. § 622.16.
64. 50 C.F.R. § 622.21(a).
65. Id. at (a)(4).
66. FINAL AMENDMENT 40, supra note 10, at 1; see also Guindon, 31 F. Supp.
3d at 178.
67. Guindon, 31 F. Supp. 3d at 178.
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2. Recreational Fishing Regulations Through the 2014 Season
Before the enactment of Amendment 40, the recreational sector was
awarded a portion of the year’s overall red snapper quota and was
regulated by its quota,68 a bag limit,69 a size limit,70 and fishing seasons.71
The only accountability measure implemented in recreational red snapper
regulations was the in-season closure.72 The recreational sector of the red
snapper fishery was composed of two entities: private anglers/vessels73
and for-hire vessels.74 These two groups had to abide by the bag limit, size
limit, and closed season regulations; additionally, they had to collectively
remain within the bounds of the recreational quota. An important factor
distinguishing the two recreational bodies rested in private angler’s ability
to fish for red snapper in federal waters when the federal season was open,
and in state waters when the state season was open.75 By contrast, for-hire
operators had to abide by the length of the federal season in procuring their
annual harvest and, hence, could only fish for red snapper while the federal
season was open.76 Furthermore, in 2004, the NMFS placed a moratorium
on the issuance of new federal for-hire reef fish permits.77 As a result, forhire vessels today consist only of those who were federal for-hire operators
prior to 2004.78 Since the moratorium was issued, the number of private
recreational vessels has increased, and the number of federal for-hire
operators has decreased.79 Because of the disparity between the number of
private and for-hire vessels and the private vessels’ ability to fish in state

68. See 50 C.F.R. § 622.21.
69. See 50 C.F.R. § 622.38(b)(3).
70. See 50 C.F.R. § 622.37(a)(1).
71. See 50 C.F.R. § 622.34(b) (stating the recreational sector season in the
EEZ closes from January 1 through May 31). “NMFS estimates in advance how
long it will take for the recreational sector to harvest its quota, based on historical
data, then sets the season length according to that projection.” Guindon, 31 F.
Supp. 3d at 178-79.
72. Guindon, 31 F. Supp. 3d at 178-79; 78 Fed. Reg. at 17883; Accountability
measures are “management controls to prevent ACLs, including sector–ACLs,
from being exceeded, and to correct or mitigate overages of the ACL if they
occur.” 50 C.F.R. § 600.310(g)(1).
73. FINAL AMENDMENT 40, supra note 10, at x (describing private vessels as
vessels fishing for sport or pleasure without a federal reef-fish permit).
74. Id. (describing for-hire vessels as vessels fishing for sport or pleasure with
a federal reef-fish permit).
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. See id.
79. FINAL AMENDMENT 40, supra note 10, at x.
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waters, private vessel harvesting of red snapper has accounted for a greater
proportion of the recreational quota as a whole.80
III. TANGLING LINES DURING A FEEDING FRENZY: INITIAL LITIGATION,
THE 2014 SEASON, AND THE CHAOTIC STATE OF GULF RED SNAPPER
MANAGEMENT
In 2012, an amendment to the Reef Fish FMP generated total red
snapper quotas for the 2012 and 2013 seasons for both commercial and
recreational fishermen.81 The 2012 total quota was set at 8.08 million
pounds, and the 2013 total quota was fixed at 8.69 million pounds.82 The
amendment also provided that, if the 2012 ABC was exceeded during the
2012 season, the 2012 quota would remain in place for the 2013 season.83
The recreational sector exceeded its quota in 2012 by 1.187 million
pounds, yet the GMFMC inexplicably chose to set the 2013 quota at 8.46
million pounds instead of again utilizing the 2012 quota as the 2012
amendment demanded.84 The Council did not set any future quotas because
of a new SEDAR stock assessment that was to be produced later in 2013.85
In response to the NMFS’s actions, the five states under GMFMC’s
authority planned to implement season lengths and bag limits that were
less stringent than the proposed federal regulations.86 The NMFS then
issued an emergency rule in March 2013 that enacted state closure dates
for the recreational sector.87 Two months later, a “May Final Rule”
implemented the 8.46 million pound (mp) quota88 and imposed season
closure dates for each Gulf state.89 The District Court for the Southern
District of Texas found that the rule was inconsistent with the requisite
emergency ruling criteria measures and held the state-specific season
closure dates to be a violation of 16 U.S.C. § 1851(a)(4).90 After the district
court vacated the rule,91 the NMFS set a Gulf-wide recreational sector
closure date and maintained the 8.46 mp quota.92

80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.

Id. at x–xi.
Guindon, 31 F. Supp. 3d at 181.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Guindon, 31 F. Supp. 3d at 181.
4.315 mp commercial quota and 4.145 mp recreational quota.
Guindon, 31 F. Supp. 3d at 181.
Id. (citing Texas v. Crabtree, 948 F. Supp. 2d 676, 690 (S.D. Tex. 2013)).
Id.
Id.
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In July 2013, the Council devised two more proposals for the 2013 red
snapper season.93 The Council wanted to increase the 2013 overall quota
and then, depending on the availability of unused quota, reopen the season
in the fall.94 The NMFS obtained landing estimates from the Marine
Recreational Information Program95 (MRIP) in late August that revealed
an overage exceeding both the current and proposed quota.96 Despite these
discoveries, the NMFS still proceeded to reopen the season in the fall.97
A. Setting the Hook: Guindon v. Pritzker
By 2014, the recreational fishing sector had exceeded its red snapper
quota in six out of the past seven seasons.98 In response, commercial
fishermen filed suit99 against the Secretary, the NOAA, the NMFS, and the
Coastal Conservation Association (CCA)100 alleging that the May Final
Rule and June Temporary Rule of 2013 violated multiple provisions of the
MSA.101 In Guindon v. Pritzker, the commercial fishermen contended that
inadequate regulatory measures in the Gulf red snapper recreational sector,
as well as consistent recreational quota overruns, posed negative effects—
both current and prospective—on their industry.102
The CCA countered that these commercial fishermen lacked Article
III standing, that their claims were moot, and that they did not properly
raise their concerns with the NMFS according to regulatory procedure.103
The District Court for the District of Columbia disagreed with each of the
CCA’s defenses,104 finding that commercial red snapper fishermen could
appropriately challenge these actions because the overharvesting of red
snapper could negatively affect both sectors’ interests in the health of the
fishery.105 Plaintiffs demonstrated that overages in the recreational sector
could affect the plan for “constant catch” in future years,106 and the court

93. Id. at 193.
94. Guindon, 31 F. Supp. 3d at 193–94.
95. MRIP is “the primary data source for estimating” the total weight of red
snapper landed by recreational fishermen. Id. at 179.
96. Id. at 183.
97. Id. at 193.
98. Id. at 188.
99. The suit was filed in the United States District Court for the District of
Columbia.
100. CCA was a defendant-intervenor in the suit.
101. Guindon, 31 F. Supp. 3d at 192.
102. Id. at 193–200.
103. Id. at 186.
104. Id. at 187.
105. Id.
106. Guindon, 31 F. Supp. 3d.
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held that overharvesting was directly traceable to the NMFS’s actions.107
The Guindon court also determined that plaintiffs’ claims were rooted in
the exact kind of agency actions for which the “capable-of-repetition-yetevading-review” exception exists, as the recreational sector had exceeded
its allotted quota in six out of the past seven years. Given the short notice
of the emergency rules, these actions fell under that exception.108
With no prior jurisprudence guiding the issue, the Guindon court
interpreted section 407(d) of the MSA to require that the NMFS close the
season, without the ability to reopen it, once it was determined that the quota
had been reached.109 As of 2013, the agency had experienced years of
recreational quota overruns, and the NMFS should have acknowledged that
its process in incrementally shortening the season was not working.110 The
court opined, in dicta, that the NMFS could comply with the requirements of
section 407(a) by enacting a regulation prohibiting the retention of fish above
the quota (including setting an accurate and conservative season length in
advance based on a projection of when the quota would likely be met—i.e., a
dramatically shortened season), a buffer, or some other strategy.111
The NMFS attempted to defend reopening the season despite
excessive harvests by arguing that if it had the technology of MRIP
landings, it would have originally set a more accurate, higher quota and
ABC for the 2013 quota.112 The Guindon court found this argument to be
without merit, and it instead held that the NMFS, by its very failure to use
the best scientific technology available, had violated a national standard
set forth in the MSA.113 In other words, the NMFS should not have
reopened the red snapper season in the fall absent utilization of the MRIP
landings technology.
Additionally, the NMFS erred, according to the Guindon court, in
failing to impose any accountability measures in accordance with section
303(a)(15) of the MSA.114 While the Council’s Scientific and Statistical
Committee (SSC) had recommended an added buffer for the recreational
sector quota due to the uncertainty and management disparities between
the recreational and commercial sectors,115 the Council did not accept the
buffer regulation—and the NMFS wrongfully approved that omission.116
The court chose not to stipulate which accountability measures would have
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 194.
Id. at 193.
Id.
Guindon, 31 F. Supp. 3d at 195.
Id. at 195.
Id. at 200.
Id. at 199.
Id. at 182.
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been appropriate, leaving that determination to the discretion of agency
experts.117
Finally, the Guindon court held that the NMFS violated section 304(b)
and National Standard 4 of the MSA by deciding to ignore the already
exceeded recreational quota and reopen the red snapper season during the
fall.118 That violation contravened the terms of the FMP by failing to
reflect the 51:49 allocation split between the commercial and recreational
sectors. National Standard 4 was violated in not providing an equitable
allocation of fishing privileges to all fishermen.119
B. Setting the Drag Too Tight: The 2014 Recreational Red Snapper
Season
In May of 2014, the NMFS declared a conservatory and managerial
need to issue a temporary “emergency” rule bearing on the 2014 Gulf of
Mexico red snapper recreational season.120 In its ruling, the GMFMC
issued a nine-day recreational season based on the Annual Catch Target
(ACT), which would run from June 1 to June 9, 2014, as well as a twenty
percent buffer.121 The GMFMC openly stated that the emergency ruling
was issued to prevent a recreational quota overrun, in response to the
interpretation of MSA provisions under Guindon.122
More specifically, the NMFS’s 2014 emergency ruling123 responded
to dicta in Guindon, wherein the court opined that an effective regulatory
measure to prevent a recreational quota overrun might take the form of a
dramatically shortened federal recreational red snapper season.124 In an
effort to avoid litigation similar to Guindon, the GMFMC enacted the 2014
emergency rule to abide by the MSA and curb recreational quota overruns.

117. Id. at 200.
118. Guindon, 31 F. Supp. 3d at 195.
119. Id. at 200.
120. 2014 Limited Commercial and Recreational Fishing Seasons for Red
Snapper in the Southern Atlantic States, 79 Fed. Reg. 32,496, 32,497 (June 5, 2014).
121. Id. at 32,496.
122. Gulf of Mexico 2014 Recreational Red Snapper Season Final Emergency
Rule––Accountability Measures: Frequently Asked Questions, NATIONAL MARINE
F ISHERIES S ERVICE (May 2014), http://sero.nmfs.noaa.gov/sustainable
_fisheries/gulf_fisheries/reef_fish/2013/rs_2014_rec/documents/pdfs/red_snapper_e
r_2014_faqs.pdf [https://perma.cc/G74H-FYWN].
123. Id.
124. Guindon, 31 F. Supp. 3d at 175.
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C. Spooling: The Disarray in Federal Management of Gulf Red Snapper
Prompting Change
Though the Council’s ruling may have helped in preventing a
recreational sector overrun, the extremely short recreational federal season
left many anglers outraged. Furious fishermen demanded answers: Why
restrict federal seasons so severely when the red snapper population was—
and remains—healthy enough for the catch limit to increase every year?
The NMFS attempted to answer that question—and justify the
truncated federal season—on the grounds that the rate of recreational catch
continues to increase.125 In recent years, recreational fishermen caught
eight times as many pounds of Gulf red snapper as they did before the
population began to recover, and three to four times the 2007 rate.126 While
the catch limit increased by 120 percent from 2009 to 2013, recreational
catches increased by 800 percent per day.127 Furthermore, the amount of
fish caught in state waters has increased tremendously in the past five to
eight years.128 The NMFS concluded that, because of the increased catch
rates and the growing amount of red snapper harvested in state waters, the
federal season must be shortened in order to adequately manage the
fishery.129 As such, the measure, in some ways, seems an unavoidable
necessity to the Council’s prevention of quota overruns and future
litigation.
Unappeased by that rationale, recreational fishermen have continued
to voice strong opposition to the extremely stringent standards imposed on
the 2014 season. The controversy surrounding the short season has created
massive rifts between commercial and recreational fishermen, as well as
between federal and state agencies.
At its essence, the main problem with the current management of Gulf
red snapper is two-fold. First, the Council has instituted shorter federal
recreational red snapper seasons each year because of the rapid increase in
which recreational fishermen are filling the quota. Because of the length
of recent federal seasons, private and for-hire anglers have been extremely
limited as to the amount of time in which they may fish in federal waters.
Second, shorter federal recreational seasons have increased private
anglers’ fishing efforts in state waters and have actually exacerbated the
125. National Marine Fisheries Service, Southeast Regional Office, 2013
recreational red snapper quota closure analysis, SERO-LAPP-2012-10 (Dec. 2012)
available at http://sero.nmfs.noaa.gov/sustainable_fisheries/gulf_fisheries/red
_snapper/documents/pdfs/gulf_red_snapper_quota_closure.pdf.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Id.
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management problem because more of the quota is being fulfilled by
private anglers in state waters when federal waters are closed. The social
result has been: (1) for-hire operators’ discontent with their lack of
equitable access to the fishery compared to private anglers, and (2) private
and for-hire operators’ frustration with the narrow time period in which
they can fish in federal waters. The more important results are private
anglers expending a disproportionate amount of the recreational quota
compared to the federal for-hire operators, and recreational landings
consistently exceeding the recreational quota year after year.
Although red snapper fishery management has been a “mess” for
several years, the stringency of the 2014 regulations infuriated Gulf
fishermen enough to cause them to demand immediate action.130 Many
anglers have asserted that the nine-day recreational season restricted
access to an abundant natural resource—the limitation was not the result
of necessary conservation efforts but instead flowed from the fact that the
overall management of the fishery remains in utter disarray.131 Knowing
that a better management approach is essential to the future of the red
snapper industry in the Gulf of Mexico, the NMFS and the GMFMC
approved Amendment 40 to aid in the resolution of the problem.132
IV. POPPING THE LINE: AMENDMENT 40, THE 2015 SEASON, AND
RECENT LITIGATION
In response to the recent red snapper controversy, the GMFMC
convened on October 23, 2014 to approve Amendment 40. On April 10,
2015, the NMFS approved the amendment and it was subsequently
published as a Final Rule in the Federal Register.133 Effective May 22,
2015, Amendment 40 institutes distinct private angling and federal forhire components within the recreational red snapper fishery and allocates
red snapper resources between the two recreational divisions.134 The
NMFS claims that establishing these two divisions provides a basis for

130. David Cresson, Guest Commentary: Gulf Fishery Management a Huge
Mess, BATON ROUGE ADVOCATE, (Aug. 28, 2014), http://theadvocate.com/news
/opinion/10116820-123/guest-commentary-gulf-fishery-manangement [https:
//perma.cc/9UWT-F4CC].
131. Todd Masson, Gulf Fishing Authority Says Red-snapper Fix is Easy, NOLA,
(Aug. 22, 2014, 2:19 PM), http://www.nola.com/outdoors/index.ssf/2014/08
/gulf_fishing_authority_says_re.html [https://perma.cc/VUF6-QNVQ].
132. See FINAL AMENDMENT 40, supra note 10, at i, xxii, 125, 131.
133. Amendment 40, 80 Fed. Reg. 22,422, 22,423 (Apr. 22, 2015) (to be
codified at 50 C.F.R. pt. 622).
134. Id.
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flexible management of red snapper tailored to fit each division.135 The
plan purports to reduce the probability of a recreational quota overrun by
attempting to produce the optimum yield of red snapper while also aiding
in the rebuilding of the red snapper species.136 The amendment also
contains a three-year sunset provision and establishes separate red snapper
season closures for each component of the recreational sector.137
A. Tying a Quick, Loose Knot in Attempting to Catch One Quickly:
Amendment 40
Under the provisions of the amendment, the recreational sector is split
into two subdivisions – federal for-hire anglers and private anglers.138 The
federal for-hire group is composed of anglers with federal charter vessel
permits; private anglers include private vessel anglers and state-permitted
for-hire vessels.139 The amendment allocates 42.3 percent of the quota to
the for-hire component and the remaining 57.7 percent to private
anglers.140 Seasons for both components of the recreational sector will
commence on June 1, and the length of each component’s season will be
based upon the ACT, with a twenty percent buffer.141 The sunset clause in
the amendment provides that recreational sector separation will cease at
the end of 2017, unless federal agencies take further action.142
B. A Short Fight: The 2015 Season
The total recreational quota for the 2015 season was 7.01 million
pounds.143 The final ACT for the for-hire component was 2.371 mp and
3.234 mp for private anglers.144 Based on these numbers, the private angler
season lasted from June 1–10, 2015, and the for-hire season lasted June 1–
135. GULF OF MEXICO FISHERY MGMT. COUNCIL, RECREATIONAL RED SNAPPER
SECTOR SEPARATION: PUBLIC HEARING DRAFT FOR AMENDMENT 40, 14 (2014),
available at http://gulfcouncil.org/docs/amendments/Reef%20Fish%20Amendment
%2040%20Public%20Hearing%20Draft.pdf. [hereinafter PUBLIC HEARING DRAFT].
136. Id.
137. Amendment 40, 80 Fed. Reg. at 22422.
138. Id. at 22423.
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Gulf of Mexico Red Snapper Final Rule–Commercial and Recreational
Quota Increases: Frequently Asked Questions, NATIONAL MARINE FISHERIES
S ERVICE (May 2015), http://sero.nmfs.noaa.gov/sustainable_fisheries/gulf
_fisheries/reef_fish/2015/rs_framework_quota/documents/pdfs/gulf_rs_framewo
rk_faqs.pdf [https://perma.cc/8ZZ4-EKLE].
144. Id.
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14, 2015.145 The bag limit was two fish with a 16-inch minimum total
length size limit.146
C. Threading the Eyelets of Amendment 40: The Aims of the Amendment
The Council has stated that, regardless of whether the recreational
sector is maintained as a single entity or divided into two components, the
overall recreational quota will not change, and fishing activity will,
therefore, most likely remain consistent.147 However, the Council predicts
that the implementation of sector separation could affect a potential shift
in private angling fishing activity from federal to state waters because state
and federal snapper seasons would remain inconsistent.148 In addition, the
Council reports that private anglers’ unfair access to red snapper over the
for-hire component would persist, again because of competition between
federal seasons and their more liberal state counterparts.149 The alleged
benefit that for-hire operators would receive in exchange would be more
equitable access to the red snapper fishery through the issuance of separate
quotas and seasons for each newly divided component.150 Interestingly, the
Council admits that the potential benefits that sector separation offers to
for-hire operators “could be decreased should the amount of red snapper
harvested in state waters outside the federal season increase.”151 In other
words, private anglers might fulfill or exceed the recreational quota in state
waters before the federal seasons start; thus, the entire red snapper quota
would be caught in state waters. Although the provisions of Amendment
40 were active during the 2015 season, the true effects of the amendment
will likely not be seen until all of the data is compiled over the next few
years.
D. Attempting to Net the Monster: 2015 Litigation
Attempting to invalidate Amendment 40, CCA members filed suit
against the Department of Commerce, the NOAA, the NMFS, and a forhire fishing association in the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Louisiana in the spring of 2015.152 The CCA alleged that the
implementation of Amendment 40 will injure them “because it will reduce
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. See FINAL AMENDMENT 40, supra note 10, at xiii.
148. Id.
149. Id. at xiv.
150. See id. at xxvii.
151. Id. at xiv.
152. Coastal Conservation Ass’n v. U.S. Dept. of Commerce, No. 15-1300,
2016 WL 54911, at *2 (E.D. La. Jan. 5, 2016).
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the maximum quantity of red snapper that individual recreational
fisherman can catch.”153
The CCA made four legal arguments for invalidating Amendment 40,154
asserting that: (1) Amendment 40 violates the MSA by regulating charter and
for-hire fishermen independently from private anglers; (2) the NMFS and the
GMFMC violated both federal statute and National Standard 8 by failing to
assess, specify, and analyze the economic and social effects of Amendment
40; (3) Amendment 40 violates National Standard 4 by effectuating an unfair
and inequitable allocation of fishery resources; and (4) Amendment 40
establishes an improper delegation of the GMFMC’s authority by authorizing
the NMFS to determine allocation levels.155
After both plaintiffs and defendants moved for summary judgment,
Judge Milazzo ruled in favor of the defendants in January of 2016.156
While discussions of a potential appeal are circulating, it seems rather
unlikely that courts will find Amendment 40 is invalid. Despite its
apparent legal validity, Amendment 40 does not offer the long-term
solution needed in Gulf red snapper management. While the Amendment
remains in effect, more prudent solutions should be contemplated to ensure
appropriate long-term regulations for the fishery.
E. Popped Line: Why Amendment 40 is Not the Permanent Solution
Regulatory management schemes raise major concerns for private
vessels, for-hire operators, and the Council, as proper apportionment of
the red snapper quota between the two recreational components is crucial.
Amendment 40 attempts to resolve this problem, but, while it may deliver
some prospective benefits, it fails to provide the requisite long-term
solution needed for the Gulf red snapper fishery.
The only accountability measure included in pre-Amendment 40
regulations––federal season closure––has proven unsuccessful in
preventing recreational quota overruns, primarily because of private
anglers’ ability to fish for red snapper in state waters. As seen in past years,
the recreational sector has exceeded its quota under a variety of different
management measures, and sector separation does not provide any
concrete solution to this problem. Though the amendment will apportion
the quota between the two divided sectors, the only accountability measure
remains season closures—a mechanism that on its own has proven
ineffective. Theoretically, the provisions of Amendment 40 will aid in
153.
154.
155.
156.

Id. at *3.
Id.
Id.
Id. at *9.
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curing the aforementioned problems by apportioning the quota between
the two new recreational components and instituting separate seasons, so
that for-hire and private anglers are afforded more equitable timeframe in
which to fulfill their quota. However, both private and federal for-hire
anglers can still potentially exceed their quotas, even with separate
seasons. Furthermore, although the amendment may quell the for-hire
versus private angler competition during the federal season by awarding
for-hire operators their own quota and season, private anglers will still
enjoy the advantage of access to red snapper in state waters, even when
their own federal season is closed.
Though Amendment 40 may effectively alleviate some of the issues
in Gulf red snapper fishing, it fails to guarantee any comprehensive
solution. While the Council asserts that sector separation will create
unique management approaches for each division, “potentially resulting in
increases in economic value,”157 the magnitude of these economic benefits
depends upon what kind of management measures are enacted.158 These
economic impacts, though potentially beneficial, are not supported by
concrete data evincing future economic gains for either sector.
Many private anglers also allege that Amendment 40 marks the
beginning of the privatization of the recreational red snapper fishery.159
Their assertion rests on the assumption that a few wealthy for-hire
operators will eventually “buy out” most of the other for-hire operators.
Because of the new allocation of the recreational quota under Amendment
40, these few for-hire operators could then monopolize access to Gulf red
snapper.160 Critics worry that private anglers fishing for red snapper will
eventually be forced out of federal waters and will only be able to gain
access to the fish there by paying the few for-hire operators controlling the
industry.161
Like the mule deer hunting permits discussed in the opening paragraph
of this article, sector separation creates a “pay-to-play” incentive for those
individuals with sufficient resources. In so doing, Amendment 40 by
necessity deprives equitable access to anglers of more meager means. This
scenario hardly seems fair, but the speculative, extreme nature of this
hypothetical, as applied in the context of the red snapper industry, render
such a monopoly implausible, at least to some extent.
157. FINAL AMENDMENT 40, supra note 10, at xv.
158. Id.
159. See COASTAL CONSERVATION ASS’N, supra note 3.
160. See id.
161. See Anglers Applaud States’ Stance on Snapper Management, Florida,
Louisiana, Texas Urge Gulf Council to back away from Sector Separation, COASTAL
CONSERVATION ASS’N, (Oct. 8, 2014), http://www.joincca.org/articles/693 [https:
//perma.cc/2ADL-E2QZ].
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Furthermore, Amendment 40 contains a “sunset clause,” whereby the
amendment will phase out after three years absent a Council vote to reenact it.162 This provision has purportedly been Amendment 40’s saving
grace, being the only reason why some Gulf states chose to vote for it.163
With the benefit of the sunset provision, the aforementioned advantages
offered by enactment of Amendment 40—particularly the potential
equitability between the private and for-hire components—can be enjoyed
without real danger of long-term harm.
Although Amendment 40 will not resolve the entire recreational
management problem, it nevertheless promises certain potential benefits.
By approving Amendment 40, those benefits can begin to take effect while
a more comprehensive solution to the larger problem is considered.
V. BREAKING THE SURFACE: A REGIONAL MANAGEMENT STRATEGY
The major issue in red snapper management remains the inadequate
management measures used to implement and prevent overruns of
recreational quotas, paired with the continuous and substantial reduction
of the length of the federal red snapper season.
As one CCA official commented, if federal red snapper regulations
continue on this same route, “a situation where private anglers will not be
allowed in federal waters in the next years” could occur.164 Instead of
continuing to enact federal regulations that fix short-term problems, the
NMFS, GMFMC, and the Gulf states must take a step back and evaluate
red snapper management as a whole. They must then work cooperatively
to develop management solutions that address all areas of concern within
the red snapper fishery.
Amendment 40 has already prompted strong opposition, litigation,
and rivalry between private and federal for-hire anglers. To combat the
current insufficient management standards and the fierce discord amongst
participants in the realm of Gulf recreational red snapper fishing, the most
prudent course of action requires implementation of a regional
management standard.

162. Amendment 40, 80 Fed. Reg. at 22,422.
163. MINORITY REPORT FOR OCTOBER 2014 MEETING OF THE GULF OF MEXICO
FISHERY MGMT. COUNCIL, § 1.3.4 (Oct. 2014), available at http://gulfcouncil.org
/docs/minority%20reports/Amendment%2040%20Minority%20Report%20Final%2
0with%20Signatures%20-%2017Dec14.pdf.
164. Barbara Liston, Fishermen tangle lines in U.S. battle over popular red
snapper, REUTERS (Jul. 19, 2014, 9:00 AM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2014
/07/19/usa-fishing-snapper-idUSL2N0PK16220140719 [https://perma.cc/MX9U7JL4].
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A. Selecting the Right Lure: Prospective Regional Management
Strategies
In contemplating an effective solution for the Gulf red snapper
management problem, the Gulf Council has considered several options for
the appropriate regulation of recreational fishermen while furthering the
goals of the MSA and the conservation of the red snapper species. Aside
from the sector separation approach proposed in Amendment 40, other
possible management strategies include: an allocation shift favoring the
recreational sector over the commercial sector, a days-at-sea program for
the for-hire sector, inter-sector trading, a fish tag program, and a for-hire
IFQ program.165
The most effective solution to the problem, however, lies in a regional
management strategy that would allocate regional catch limits among the
five Gulf states. Under this system, each state would then set its own bag
limits, size limits, and seasons. Both a 2015 House Bill and an amendment
to the Fishery Management Plan for the Reef Fish Resources of the Gulf
of Mexico have been considered in order to implement such a regional
management program, though no final action has been taken on either
plan.
1. Amendment 39
The Council has contemplated institution of a regional management
strategy for the recreational Gulf red snapper fishery since 2008; however,
no true headway was made until June of 2012, when the Louisiana
Department of Wildlife and Fisheries proposed a recreational red snapper
regional management pilot program.166 In furtherance of that effort, the
Council developed plans and scoping documents, and, in February of
2014, released the Final Draft for Amendment 39 to the Fishery
Management Plan for the Reef Fish Resources of the Gulf of Mexico
(Amendment 39). Similar to that of Amendment 40, the stated purpose of
Amendment 39, aims to “provide flexibility in the management of the red
165. Nat’l Oceanic and Atmospheric Admin., Southeast Regional Office, How
Do We Improve the Situation? Other Options for the Future, http://sero.nmfs
.noaa.gov/sustainable_fisheries/gulf_fisheries/red_snapper/overview/ [https://perma
.cc/4S6S-CTAZ] (last visited Jan. 22, 2015).
166. G ULF OF M EXICO F ISHERY M GMT . C OUNCIL , F INAL D RAFT FOR
AMENDMENT 39 TO THE F ISHERY M ANAGEMENT P LAN FOR THE R EEF F ISH
RESOURCES OF THE GULF OF MEXICO, INCLUDING DRAFT ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT
STATEMENT, FISHERY IMPACT STATEMENT, REGULATORY IMPACT REVIEW, AND
REGULATORY FLEXIBILITY ACT ANALYSIS, 3 (Feb. 2014), available at http:
//gulfcouncil.org/docs/amendments/Regional%20Management%20Red%20Snapper
.pdf [hereinafter FINAL AMENDMENT 39].
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snapper recreational component” and to prevent overfishing while
producing the maximum yield.167 However, Amendment 39 attempts to
achieve this end by utilizing a regional management strategy, modifying
for-hire permit provisions, and creating accountability measures for
recreational sector quota overages for different regions of the Gulf.168
Amendment 39 contains numerous different actions with multiple
alternatives for each action. Action 1 of Amendment 39 determines the
basic structure of regional management.169 While Alternative 1 provides a
“no action” alternative,170 the Council’s preferred option, Alternative 2,
would develop a regional management strategy delegating authority to a
Gulf state, or group thereof, to create regulations pertaining to the
recreational aspects of the fishery for an allocated portion of the quota.171
By comparison, Alternative 3 for Action 1 would implement a regional
management program that would allow the GMFMC to establish distinct
recreational management measures for certain Gulf regions.172
Under either Alternative 2 or Alternative 3 to Action 1, red snapper would
continue to be federally regulated, with the states having limited management
authority.173 States would only receive full management authority over
regulations under the provisions of Action 4, discussed infra.174 If the Council
adopts the preferred state approach in Alternative 2, the regulations chosen
must be consistent with FMPs and the MSA.175 Alternative 3, on the other
hand, bears similarities to the no action alternative, in that the Council already
enjoys the authority to establish specific regional management measures.
However, the selection of Alternative 3 would signify the Council’s intent to
implement regional management regulations, as opposed to the currently
utilized Gulf-wide regulations.176
The provisions of Action 2 contemplate determination of the regions
subject to management.177 The Council’s preferred option establishes five
separate regions––one for each Gulf state.178 Establishing each Gulf state
as its own region would undoubtedly allow the most pliability in terms of

167. Id. at 7.
168. Id. at 7.
169. Id. at 8.
170. The “no action” alternative would maintain the current regulatory
structure of the recreational Gulf red snapper fishery.
171. FINAL AMENDMENT 39, supra note 166, at 11.
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. Id. at 4.
176. Id. at 12.
177. FINAL AMENDMENT 39, supra note 166, at 14.
178. Id.
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management methods.179 The other provisions of Action 2’s other
alternatives establish multi-state regions or allow states to determine their
own regions.180 The implementation of multi-state Gulf regions would
require those states falling within a given zone to agree on shared
management measures and season closures.181
Reportedly, the source of controversy presently delaying passage of
Amendment 39 lies in Action 3, which contemplates the allocation of the
recreational red snapper quota amongst the different regions.182 Five
alternatives for apportionment are stipulated, but the GMFMC has yet to
choose its preferred alternative.183
Action 4 entails identification of the regional management measures
that each region would be allowed to implement under the guise of the
NMFS and the GMFMC.184 Current federal regulations set forth a daily
bag limit of two red snapper per angler per day, a of sixteen inch minimum
total size length limit, and a season start date commencing on June 1, each
year. Under Action 4, the preferred alternatives of the Council would allow
the regions to (1) create season structure and start and end dates;185 (2) set
bag limits ranging from zero to four red snapper per angler per day; (3)
determine minimum total size length limits between fourteen inches and
eighteen inches; (4) establish a maximum red snapper size limit; (5)
cordon off protected areas within the EEZ adjacent to their region;186 and
(6) institute sub-allocations for the private and for-hire sub-sectors.187 In
enacting these standards, regions may not create additional fishing days,
and the measures must be consistent with the region’s projected season
length and its allocated quota.188 Season dates and structure, bag limits,
and size limits comprise the obligatory measures that must be set by each
region; a region’s choices regarding the other six standards are optional.189

179. Id. at 15.
180. Id. at 14.
181. Id.
182. Id. at 17.
183. FINAL AMENDMENT 39, supra note 166, at 17.
184. Id. at 23.
185. The purported benefit of vesting this authority regionally lies in the fact
that it would allow for each region to assess the most appropriate time for seasons
according to that region’s own particular history of hurricanes, tourist seasons,
and lodging. Id.
186. This provision intends to provide regions with flexibility to spatially
control where their apportioned part of the quota is harvested within the region,
in accordance with varying weather conditions and tourism seasons. Id.
187. Id.
188. Id.
189. FINAL AMENDMENT 39, supra note 166, at 23.
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Action 5 of Amendment 39 concerns restrictions on federal permitted
for-hire vessels.190 Alternative 1 for that action would maintain the current
standards, by which federal for-hire operators must comply with federal
regulations when they are more restrictive than state regulations.191
Specifically, if federal waters are closed, a Gulf charter-permitted vessel
cannot simply travel to state waters to harvest red snapper.192 This
regulation was enacted to ensure federal regulatory compliance and to
prompt consistent state regulation through its application to commercial
and for-hire vessels.193 The chance of a landing overage declines when
federal for-hire operators fishing in state waters are required to abide by
the more restrictive federal reef fish regulations.194 By comparison,
Alternative 2 for Action 5 would exclude the provision mandating charterpermitted operators’ compliance in state waters with the more restrictive
federal recreational red snapper regulations.195
However, official action has yet to be taken on Amendment 39,
allegedly due to the Council’s protracted deliberation on the
appropriateness of the quotas to be issued to each Gulf state, and the
Amendment’s status currently remains “on hold.”
2. H.R. 3094
In 2013, Senator Mary Landrieu introduced The Gulf of Mexico Red
Snapper Conservation Act of 2013 in an attempt to institute a regional
management strategy.196 However, the congressional session ended without
any final action on the matter, and the bill died in the House. In the summer
of 2015, Representative Garret Graves introduced his own initiative to transfer
Gulf red snapper regulatory power to the Gulf states via the Gulf States Red
Snapper Management Authority Act (H.R. 3094).197
Under this bill, the Secretary would create a Gulf States Red Snapper
Management Authority (GSRSMA), which would be composed of the
“principal fisheries manager of each of the Gulf coastal states.”198 The
GSRSMA would develop measures to be followed by each Gulf state in

190. Id. at 30.
191. Id.
192. Id.
193. See id.
194. Id.
195. FINAL AMENDMENT 39, supra note 166, at 31.
196. Gulf of Mexico Red Snapper Conservation Act of 2013, H.R. 3099, 113th
Cong. (2013).
197. Gulf States Red Snapper Management Authority Act, H.R. 3094, 114th
Cong. (2015).
198. Id.
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regulating red snapper in the waters adjacent to each respective state.199
Each Gulf state would submit a FMP to the GSRSMA complying with
section 303(a) of the MSA.200 Each Gulf state’s FMP must consist of
guidelines and procedures for “the long-term sustainability of Gulf of
Mexico red snapper based on the best available science.”201 These FMPs
must also set the recreational quotas consistent with stock assessments for
the red snapper fishery adjacent to each Gulf state, while also complying
with the standards set by the GSRSMA.202 After holding a public comment
period, the GSRSMA would review each state’s FMP and approve them
if they comply with the requirements set forth by the GSRSMA as well as
section 303(a) of the MSA.203
Once the GSRSMA approves a Gulf state’s FMP, the GSRSMA
would certify to the Secretary that a FMP has been approved.204 The
Secretary would then revoke any regulations or portions of federal FMPs
that conflict with the newly approved state FMP and transfer management
of the Gulf red snapper to the GSRSMA.205 Each Gulf state would then
assume responsibility for enforcing its approved FMP.206 All federal
funding would be distributed by the Gulf States Marine Fisheries
Commission to the Gulf states.207
Following the transfer of management to the states, the GSRSMA
must assess whether each Gulf state has properly adopted and
implemented the approved FMP, and whether the FMP is consistent with
the previously-set GSRSMA standards and the long-term sustainability of
the fishery.208
If, by chance, overfishing occurs, or if the fishery is subject to a
rebuilding plan in the waters adjacent to a Gulf state, that state must certify
to the GSRSMA that it enacted the requisite measures to prevent
overfishing or to rebuild the fishery and that it consulted with the NOAA
and implemented a data recording program to appropriately monitor such
state’s harvesting of red snapper.209 In the event that a state does not follow
these rules, the GSRSMA would then vote on whether to recommend that
199. Id.
200. Id.
201. Id.
202. Id.
203. Gulf States Red Snapper Management Authority Act, H.R. 3094, 114th
Cong. (2015).
204. Id.
205. Id.
206. Id.
207. Id.
208. Id.
209. Gulf States Red Snapper Management Authority Act, H.R. 3094, 114th
Cong. (2015).
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the Secretary to close the fishery in that state’s Gulf waters.210 The
Secretary would then have the discretion to close the fishery after
evaluating the Gulf state’s and the GSRSMA’s comments.211
Every year, each Gulf state would submit to the GSRSMA a report on
the fishery in the coastal waters adjacent to each respective state.212 At
least once every five years, the GSRSMA would, in turn, submit a report
to the Secretary of Commerce using the information provided in each Gulf
state’s annual report.213 Additionally, the administrator of the NOAA
would supply Congress with an annual report of effects of the act.214
During the three years that this law would be in effect, the Council
would continue to regulate the commercial sector of the Gulf red snapper
fishery. The act would not affect the current IFQ regulations in place for
the commercial sector.
B. Landing the Tail of a Lifetime: Advantages of the Regional
Management Strategy over Current Management Standards
The holding in Guindon exposed the undeniable source of the
management problems afflicting the entire Gulf of Mexico red snapper
fishery—ineffective regulation of the recreational snapper-fishing
sector.215 Those in the commercial sphere have felt the effects flowing
from the recreational sector’s quota activities. As discussed supra, the
main problem with current recreational regulations in recent years has
been short federal seasons coupled with private anglers’ inequitable access
to red snapper fishing during more liberal state seasons.216 A regional
management strategy, by allowing states to assess the current status of the
Gulf fishery across jurisdictional lines, creates a system whereby states
can accurately implement catch and season limits—in both federal and
state waters—that will keep the red snapper population healthy and afford
private anglers and federal for-hire anglers fair access to the fishery. The
Council, in its attempt to conserve the fishery, has been imposing stricter
seasons and standards to counteract each Gulf state’s longer red snapper
season, but the competition has already prompted litigation and retaliation
by anglers. This fiery feud will likely continue to spiral out of control if
the fishery is not placed under effective management soon.

210.
211.
212.
213.
214.
215.
216.

Id.
Id. This only refers to closing the fishery in federal waters.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See Guindon, 31 F. Supp. 3d at 175.
See id. at 178–81.
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Some opponents of Amendment 40 claim that the quota standard should
be done away with altogether,217 but that solution will not properly address
the problem. The quota standard ensures that anglers can yield the maximum
amount of landings without imperiling the future of the red snapper species.
By allowing Gulf states to assess the current state of the fishery, states can set
appropriate federal and state seasons that work cooperatively to achieve the
MSA’s goals without the need for the systemic federal-state competition
currently bearing on the red snapper season.
A regional management strategy will consider the unique differences
and needs in each Gulf region. Specifically, the needs of anglers from
states with nine-mile jurisdictions can be addressed in a different manner
than those of fishermen who need only travel three miles to fish in federal
waters.218 Furthermore, a regional strategy will enable the enactment of
regulations appropriate to each state’s particular circumstances, such as
variations in weather patterns and tourist seasons among the Gulf states.219
Additionally, a Gulf state’s research programs will asses with greater
accuracy the migratory patterns and presence of red snapper in its state
waters and federal waters during certain time periods, making it more
tenable for states to ensure that red snapper are not overfished in one area
as compared to another, thus maintaining a healthy population in both
federal and state waters. By planning state and federal seasons
conjunctively, the states will be able to set regulations that avoid providing
private anglers an unfair advantage in freer access to state waters that
federal for-hire operators lack.
Cooperative federalism between the Council and Gulf states will
ensure the most effective management plan. The states possess the
optimum means and measures to evaluate their regions’ fishing needs and
deficiencies, and they will correct those issues if given the authority to set
their own standards. Under a cooperative federalist regime, the states’
ability to communicate their regional status to federal agencies will benefit
those agencies by providing them with better knowledge to inform
administrative decision-making. Furthermore, a regional management
program will also place a check on states’ powers by requiring submission
of all chosen regulations to the GMFMC, which would ensure that the
regulations align with the goals and provisions of the FMP. Finally,
mandated approval by the Secretary of Commerce would guarantee
consistency between the respective states’ regulations, the GMFMC’s
FMP, and the goals, national standards, and requirements of the MSA.

217. See Masson, supra note 131.
218. See FINAL AMENDMENT 39, supra note 166.
219. See id.
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Despite its numerous benefits, a regional management program will,
admittedly, not be without flaws. A regional regulatory system is inherently
more complex. The overall quota for the entire Gulf region must be
appropriately and rationally distributed amongst all of the states, and such
allocation can cause prospective debate—that task has, in fact, already caused
delays in the process.220 Additionally, the synergy of federal and state
management efforts could potentially generate further conflict between the
two entities.221 Moreover, authority vested in multiple governing bodies, as
opposed to one federal sovereign, could decrease efficiency in managing the
red snapper species. States must also be receptive to accepting new quotas,
should geographical changes in the distribution of red snapper so require.222
Regional management would also be more expensive due to the necessity of
collecting larger data samples and examining more extensive catch records.223
Finally, regulatory enforcement could be problematic, especially along
boundaries between regions with differing seasons and limits.224
Before enacting a regional management strategy for the recreational Gulf
red snapper fishery, the Council must contemplate solutions to these problems
and preparations must be made to address any complications. For example, to
ameliorate the enforcement issues raised by anomalous regulations along
regional boundaries, agents could, upon checking a fishermen’s dockside
landings, adhere to the standards of the adjoining state with the more liberal
regulations.225
Despite the potential obstacles that a regional management strategy might
present, that regime still offers the best solution to the current problems in
federal Gulf red snapper management; regional management may in fact be
the only truly effective method of resolving the ills facing the Gulf fishery.
For that reason, the Council must agree on an appropriate quota allocation for
each Gulf state and trust the states to efficiently and effectively impose
regulations, in keeping with the goals of the MSA, on red snapper in its region.
Enactment of either H.R. 3094 or Amendment 39 should sufficiently
provide for proper conservation and preservation of the Gulf red snapper
species, while rendering the maximum harvest to commercial and recreational
fishermen alike. Amendment 39, however, offers more possible management
options than H.R. 3094. Thus, Amendment 39 ostensibly provides the more
sound solution to the management problem, as the Gulf Council and Gulf
states can continue to research and analyze which alternatives of each of the
amendment’s actions should be implemented.
220.
221.
222.
223.
224.
225.

Id.
Id.
Id.
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See FINAL AMENDMENT 39, supra note 166, at 3.
Id.
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CONCLUSION
The recent debate surrounding the federal management of Gulf red
snapper arises from years of complications and controversies surrounding
this unique fish, upon which so much of the Gulf region’s cultural identity
and financial well-being turns. Despite a massive decline in the species in
the late twentieth century, federal regulations have allowed the Gulf red
snapper population to prosper. Recently, however, federal recreational
management standards have been forced to contend with increasing catch
rates and broader, more liberal state regulations. This competition has led
to a calamitous regulatory landscape for fishermen and has produced
unfavorable results for federal agencies. In an attempt to address the
complications of recreational red snapper management, the GMFMC’s
approval of Amendment 40 represents only the first step towards
effectively regulating this component of the fishery. While the
consequences of Amendment 40 are yet to be seen, more comprehensive
options must be explored, and further action will be necessary.
Although the plan will likely not take effect for a few years, a regional
management strategy should be agreed upon and implemented to
effectively regulate the Gulf recreational red snapper sector. Such a
program provides the most viable path to achieving proper preservation
and conservation of the species, while at the same time maximizing
harvests and access for anglers. Sportfishing for Gulf red snapper bears
too much economic and cultural significance for both the Gulf region, and
the United States as a whole, to allow the fishery to continuously be thrust
into a state of contentious debate and poor regulatory measures. Fishermen
and governmental agencies alike will discover harmony and success in
enacting a regional management strategy that motivates both state and
federal officials to mutually bolster the conservation and management of
this coveted fish.
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